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the darkness and the flame, and finally down from the pit of fraud towards frozen Cocytus, wherein are fixed the spirits of those who have committed the supreme sin of treachery.

Formed by the union of all the rivers of hell, Cocytus stagnates because there is no lower depth towards which it can flow. Upon its frozen surface stand the giants. Nimrod, a dull and confused spirit, speaks a language no man can understand, and all other languages are incomprehensible to him. Ephialtes "has his right arm pinioned down behind and the other before, and a chain holds him clasped from the neck downwards." The sinners, immovable in the ice, have power only to weep, and as the tears gush from their lids they freeze, and this closes their eyes. The only other activities mentioned are butting, champing of the teeth, and the flapping of Lucifer's wings, which makes the winds that freeze Cocytus.

Sin has done its work ! Made for combination with his fellows, each man through sin has isolated himself from all others. Made for activity, he has lost all power to act. The indulgence, the assertion, and the corruption of self, have issued in self-destruction. "Lo Dis, and lo the place where it behooves us arm ourselves with fortitude."

It may be asked, if this view of sin be true, what hope can there be for sinful man ? If the logical movement of sin is not towards good but towards greater evil, how can the effect of even a single sin be undone ? The answer to this question we shall find in the study of the "Purgatorio." Meanwhile let us carry from the "Inferno" the assurance that not until the Ethiopian changes his skin and the leopard his spots can *he* do good that is accustomed to do evil.

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## THE MORAL CREATIVENESS OF MAN.

BY FRANCIS ELLINGWOOD ABBOT.

It is a well-recognized principle, since Kant, that the human mind energizes in three fundamentally distinct ways: namely, thinking, feeling, and willing. No analysis has yet succeeded in reducing these three modes of consciousness to one, or in discov-

ering a more primitive mode of which they are derivatives in common. But it by no means follows that they can exist separately. On the contrary, it is more than probable that they can only exist in inseparable combination. A "state of consciousness," instead of being (as is sometimes strangely imagined) a simple or ultimate phenomenon, is complex to the last degree—a compound of psychical elements so numerous as to baffle all attempts at exhaustive specification, a resultant of forces so numerous and so subtle as to extinguish even the hope of exact or complete comprehension. It would take the whole past of the whole universe to explain fully the most insignificant fact of the present, even in the physical order of things—much more to explain fully a fact of the psychical order, involving, as it must, a world of phenomena beyond the range of physical investigation. So far is a "state of consciousness" from being a simple fact, that the entirety of human knowledge, by the confession of every competent student, is insufficient to explain it. Only the dogmatic scientist will for a moment imagine the contrary.

Nevertheless, all the innumerable currents, counter-currents, and under-currents, which constitute at any given moment what is called the "stream of consciousness," are made up of three great classes of elements which, like the so-called elements of chemistry, must be regarded as, at least provisionally, and for us, ultimate. Every "state of consciousness" is composed, in constantly varying proportions, of thoughts, feelings, and volitions; thought may predominate, feeling may predominate, volition may predominate, but each of the other two can always be detected by close observation and analysis as concurrently active. Each is a permanent and constitutive element of human consciousness, and the coexistence of the three elements is as essential to consciousness as the coexistence of three sides is essential to a triangle.

To a greater or less degree, therefore, volition enters into every conscious state; and it is owing to this fact that man is, by the primal necessities of his nature, a moral being. The provinces of volition and of morality are identical, or, at least, coterminous. A being purely intelligent, or purely sentient, or intelligent and sentient without being also volitional, would be a non-moral being; and if man could, at any moment or for any period, be purely intelligent, or purely sentient, or intelligent and sentient

without being also volitional, he, too, would be, for that moment or period, a non-moral being. It is precisely because man's volitional or moral activity never absolutely ceases or slumbers, so long as his consciousness continues, that he can never escape from the domain of moral law—that his most secret thoughts and feelings are accompanied by a volitional activity which stamps upon them all a definite moral character. And it is precisely because the fact of morality is thus indissolubly bound up with the fact of volition, as a permanent part of human nature, and a permanent factor of human consciousness, that philosophy has never escaped, and never will escape, the necessity of arriving at some solution of the ancient problem of "fate, free-will, foreknowledge absolute."

Deeply imbedded in this fact of the indissoluble connection of morality and volition lies the reason why mankind never have been, nor can be, long satisfied with a purely mechanical philosophy of human nature. It is the very essence of man to be a volitional and moral being; it is the very essence of a machine to be non-volitional and non-moral. The two concepts are absolutely incompatible, and cannot possibly be united in a seeming synthesis without a lurking self-contradiction, which inevitably, and soon, develops a distinct protest in the philosophical consciousness. No amount of ingenuity, subtilty, or genius can long succeed in rendering such a synthesis plausible. Precisely in proportion to the depth and strength of the moral consciousness in any epoch, and precisely in proportion to the degree in which the philosophical consciousness is suffused and permeated by it, will be the strength of the ultimate philosophical reaction against mechanical psychology in all its forms. It avails nothing to misrepresent this reaction as rooted in, or animated by, the spirit of an obsolete theology; its real root is the fact that mechanical psychology is vitiated at the very core by this unscientific and irreconcilable contradiction in its fundamental concepts. It is a proof neither of bigotry, nor of superstition, nor of "animism," but rather of genuine philosophical acumen, to maintain the utter repugnance of two such notions as those of humanity and mechanism; it is a proof of scientific incapacity and obtuseness not to discern the necessity of founding psychology on concepts which shall at least forbear to devour each other.

True it is that the speculative tendency of which La Mettrie's

"L'Homme Machine" is perhaps the boldest exponent has asserted itself in recent times with great energy, and may to many seem to be acquiring a permanent ascendancy. Such a view of the case, however, appears superficial to all who can distinguish between the spirit of the age and the spirit of the ages. The mechanical psychology is the natural product of a period of which the most striking characteristic is the almost miraculous growth of the mechanical and physical sciences; it marks the first attempts of scientific method, inevitably crude as they must be, to assert its rightful dominion in studies from which it had been jealously and arbitrarily excluded by the spirit of ecclesiasticism, and in which these first crude attempts should be regarded as the somewhat noisy precursors of soberer and more valuable investigations in the future. Science, in any large or full meaning of the term, is still in its infancy. It is scarcely too severe to describe it, so far as psychology, sociology, and ethics are concerned, as still being in the immature or chaotic stage of its career. The corrective of the crudities which now make many otherwise able scientific men incline to a mechanical view of man's entire nature must and will come, not at all from external opposition on the part of theological or other non-scientific antagonists, but rather from the further development of science itself—from a thoroughly scientific discrimination between those facts of human nature that can be mechanically explained and those facts of human nature that do not admit of mechanical explanation.

Darwin has permanently changed the whole course of human thought in these matters. That the theory of evolution has come to stay, and to constitute the foundation of all future theories of the universe, can be doubted by no one who knows the irresistible strength of the facts and arguments by which it is established. But whether evolution itself is to receive finally a mechanical or teleological interpretation is an issue not yet decided. Herbert Spencer, and Ernst Haeckel, with a boldness, cogency, and consistency far superior to Spencer's, advocate the mechanical view of evolution; but multitudes of keen and thoughtful minds are coming to see that this view overlooks numerous facts of the highest importance that refuse to be ignored or crowded out of sight. Unquestionably the ancient teleology, as represented by Paley, is

outgrown by the modern mind, largely for the very reason that it exhibits so fragmentary, artificial, and mechanical a character, and rests wholly on the old dualism of natural and supernatural; while the monistic teleology, latent in the very concept of evolution itself, has not as yet been anywhere adequately developed. Meanwhile the necessity of a deeper philosophical reading of the facts which pertain to man's moral nature is slowly but surely becoming felt more profoundly every year. The spirit of the age may possibly, as is claimed, be satisfied with mechanical psychology; but the spirit of the ages, which is both older and younger, is certain to assert its supremacy once more in the effort to bring all human experience into order, correlation, and harmony with this boundless cosmos. The ethical interest survives, undestroyed and indestructible; and every attempt to construct a science of ethics out of mechanical—that is, essentially non-ethical—elements is from its very inception foredoomed to failure.

It is a noteworthy fact that the only two Americans who have thus far greatly distinguished themselves by a powerful originality in the field of speculative philosophy—Jonathan Edwards and Rowland G. Hazard—have both busied themselves in the main with the same great problem of necessity or freedom in volition.<sup>1</sup> It is another fact, less patent but equally noteworthy, that this problem is the speculative side of the great practical struggle which has given to America its special significance in the history of mankind—the struggle to realize the ideal of constitutional liberty in political institutions, to reconcile individual freedom with national unity in a great political society founded on the legal recognition of equal individual rights. This is essentially an ethical conception, and one of the highest order. Edwards defended the doctrine of necessity in ethics, out of devotion to the theological doctrine of the unlimited Divine sovereignty, which from time immemorial has been the foundation of political absolutism “by the grace of God”; Dr. Hazard defends the doctrine of freedom

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<sup>1</sup> Ralph Waldo Emerson, confessedly the greatest name in American literature, is not here included, because, though he is often popularly and loosely styled a “philosopher,” that is exactly what he was not. He was *littérateur*, essayist, moralist, seer, preacher, poet, prophet—anything but “philosopher,” to whom logical concatenation, systematic construction, and comprehensive unity of form, are the very law of his being. Unsurpassed as Emerson's writings are in other respects, those are the very qualities which are most conspicuously absent in them.

in ethics, out of devotion to the modern doctrine of the limited self-sovereignty of man, which is the only possible foundation of instituted political freedom. Freedom in ethics is the thought-side of freedom in politics; the latter logically presupposes the former. It is apparent, then, that Dr. Hazard's philosophy is rooted in the soil, and interprets his country to the world; while that of Edwards was rooted in Calvinism, and, if politically realized, would have made his country an impossibility.

The connection of ethics and politics, so curiously illustrated in this instance, is no fanciful analogy, but a truth abundantly recognized in philosophy and exemplified in history. Ethics may be defined as the science of self-government by man as an individual, and politics as the science of self-government by man as a society of individuals; they are but two subdivisions of one and the same future science of human self-government, or *anthroponomy*, founded throughout on the same principle of individual moral freedom under universal moral law. The popular conception and practice of politics as the empirical administration of states in the interest of partisan or even personal self-aggrandizement reveal clearly the small progress yet made in the moral education of the race. In the present state of opinion, ethical law and political action have little, if anything, to do with each other; but, if the evolution of human society is to continue in the future as it has done in the past, the time must yet come when man, as a free moral being, will govern himself both individually and politically by the ethical idea, and recognize the binding force of justice in the action of nations no less than in that of persons. In fact, the moral creativeness of man, which Dr. Hazard has so ably vindicated with reference to the formation of personal character, is just as forcibly illustrated in the institutions, laws, and customs of communities as in the characters of individuals. No treatment of ethics can be thorough or complete which omits to consider the action of the individual as a member of the politico-moral community, or which fails to emphasize the oneness of the law that should govern man's conduct both as an individual and as a social being, or which is so narrowed in scope by the spirit of individualism as not to teach that customs, laws, and institutions incorporate the aggregate conscience of the community, just as indisputably as words and deeds incorporate the personal conscience of the indi-

vidual. In brief, man is by nature a social being, and politics ought to mean the *ethics of society*.<sup>1</sup>

It is from this consideration of the profound identity of ethics and politics, and from the entire confluence of his ethical speculations with the deepest currents of American thought, feeling, and life, that we regard Dr. Hazard, notwithstanding the eminence of his great Puritan predecessor, as having laid the first foundations of a distinctively American philosophy. The venerable octogenarian thinker himself makes no such pretension and entertains no such ambition; but the "extraordinary ability" and "philosophical talents of a very high order" which were recognized in his works by the "North American Review" of October, 1869, in an elaborate review of them by no less competent a critic than Professor George P. Fisher, have not escaped the admiring recognition of others, and can scarcely fail to command in time the attention, the wide-spread study, and the ultimate influence they deserve. Dr. Channing, in his lecture on "Self-Culture," thus alludes to Dr. Hazard's earliest published paper, the "Essay on Language," published in 1835, and republished and edited with other papers in 1857, by Miss Elizabeth P. Peabody: "I have known a man of vigorous intellect, who had enjoyed few advantages of early education, and whose mind was almost engrossed by the details of an extensive business, who composed a book of much original thought, in steamboats and on horseback, while visiting distant customers." It was, in fact, in large measure owing to the urgency of Dr. Channing, who greatly desired to see an adequate reply to Edwards's arguments against freedom, that Dr. Hazard undertook the composition of his "Freedom of Mind in Willing," though the completed work (D. Appleton & Co., 1864) was not published till many years after Dr. Channing's death. The speculations of John Stuart Mill, who, though dissenting from his metaphysical views, expressed great respect for Dr. Hazard's financial and metaphysical writings, occasioned the publication of a later book (Lee & Shepard, 1869), entitled "Two Letters on Causation and Freedom in Willing, addressed to John Stuart Mill." These two books contain the fullest and most elaborate statement of Dr. Hazard's

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<sup>1</sup> How profoundly Dr. Hazard has always recognized this great truth appears conspicuously in his noble lecture on the "Causes of the Decline of Political Morality," as contained in his "Essay on Language, and other Papers." Boston, 1857.



system. But he has just published a new book entitled, "*Man a Creative First Cause*" (Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1883), which contains two lectures recently delivered, and presents a general summary of his thought in a beautiful, interesting, and winning manner.

It is not our present object either to epitomize, analyze, or criticise these various writings, but simply to call attention to them, in the hope that thoughtful readers may procure and study them for themselves, as the most original and remarkable contribution to philosophy yet made in this country. Dr. Hazard's want of familiarity with the history of philosophy is in many respects a disadvantage; yet it is a great advantage, also, in so far as it has protected him from the danger of allowing his rare genius to be suffocated under a mass of mere erudition, or to be diverted into the channel of mere criticism or reproduction. Too much study of what other men have written, no less than too little study of it, has its own peculiar peril; excess of discipleship and defect of that self-reliance which is the inexorable condition of profound original insight have thus far made America a follower, not a leader, in philosophy. Equally removed from servile imitation and conceited self-assertion, the shining merit of Dr. Hazard's thinking is, that he has serenely trusted his own soul—wrestled indomitably at first hand with one of the most difficult problems of philosophy—meditated, pondered, and mused, with eye fixed steadily on his subject rather than on what men have written about it; and finally wrought out results which only flippant incapacity will despise. It is not necessary to accept all these results in order to appreciate their value; we certainly do not accept them all: it is enough to recognize the freshness of his point of view, the delicacy and subtilty of his analysis, the force and acuteness of his reasoning, the general purity and beauty of his style, and, above all, the moral dignity and elevation of his spirit. The one central purpose of his thought is the vindication of *freedom*, as the essential condition and necessary logical presupposition of all morality, whether in theory or in practice; and it is safe to say that mechanical psychology will never permanently establish itself as scientifically true until it has first reckoned with Dr. Hazard—first understood, and then on the same high plane satisfactorily offset, the weighty moral considerations adduced in support of his

position. It is in our opinion highly probable that even his qualified *Berkeleyanism* will fail to receive the sanction of the philosophy of the future; but this is unnecessary to his main argument, as he himself explicitly admits, and we cannot regard it as otherwise than an excrescence upon the ethical theory with which it is associated. Waiving this point, however, as unsuitable for discussion at present, we quote the following terse summary of his doctrine from "Man a Creative First Cause" (pp. 92 *et sqq.*):

"We have now endeavored to show that the only efficient cause, of which we have any real knowledge, is mind in action, and that there cannot be any unintelligent cause whatever.

"That every being endowed with knowledge, feeling, and volition is, in virtue of these attributes, a self-active, independent power, and, in a sphere which is commensurate with its knowledge, a creative first cause therein, freely exerting its powers to modify the future, and make it different from what it would otherwise be; and that the future is always the composite result of the action of all such intelligent creative beings.

"That in this process of creating the future, every such conative being, from the highest to the lowest, acts with equal and perfect freedom, though each one, by its power to change the conditions to be acted upon, or rather, by such change of the conditions or otherwise, to change the *knowledge* of all others, may influence the free action of any or all of them, and thus cause such free action of others to be different from what, but for his own action, it would have been.

"That every such being has innately the ability to will, i. e., make effort, which is self-acting; and also the knowledge that by effort it can put in action the powers by which it produces change within or without itself.

"That the only conceivable inducement or *motive* of such being to effort is, a desire—a want—to modify the future; for the gratification of which it directs its effort by means of its knowledge.

"That when such being so directs its effort by means of its *innate* knowledge, it is what is called an *instinctive* effort, but is still a self-directed and consequently a *free* effort.

"That when the mode or plan of action is devised by itself, by its own preliminary effort, it is a *rational* action.

"That when, instead of devising a plan for the occasion, we through memory adopt one which we have previously formed, we have the distinguishing characteristic of *habitual* action.

"In the instinctive and habitual we act promptly from a plan ready-

formed in the mind, requiring no premeditation as to the mode or plan of action. But in all cases our effort is incited by our want, and directed by means of our knowledge, to the desired end, which, whatever the particular exciting want, is always in some way to affect the future. In our efforts to do this in the sphere external to us, which is the common arena of all intelligent activity, we are liable to be more or less counteracted or frustrated by the efforts of others. In it man is a coworker with God and with all other conative beings, and in it can influence the actual flow of events only in a degree somewhat proportioned to his limited power and knowledge.

"But that in the sphere of man's own moral nature the effort is itself the consummation of his creative conceptions, and hence in this sphere man is a *supreme* creative first cause, limited in the effects he may there produce only by that *limit* of his knowledge by which his creative preconceptions are circumscribed.

"And further that, as a man directs his act by means of his knowledge, and can morally err only by *knowingly willing* what is wrong, his *knowledge* as to this is infallible; and, as his *willing* is his own free act, an act which no other being or power can do for him, he is in the sphere of his moral nature a sole creative cause, solely responsible for his action in it.

"His only possible wrong is in his freely willing counter to his knowledge of right. He must have known the wrong at the time he willed, or it would not be a moral wrong. Hence the knowledge by which he directs his acts of will is here as infallible as that of omniscience; and, his power to will within the limits of his knowledge being unlimited, he cannot excuse himself on the ground of his own fallible nature, but is fully and solely responsible for all the wrong he intended, or which he foresaw and might by right action have prevented. Conversely, a rightful action indicates no virtue beyond the knowledge and intent of the actor. The failure to make an effort demanded by his convictions of right is in itself a wrong. That, in the domain of his own moral nature, man is thus supreme, indicates it as his especial sphere of activity. Ages of successful effort in the material has been the preparation for its successful occupation, and we may reasonably expect that the advance into the more ethereal realm of the spiritual will be marked by the sublimest efforts of pure and lofty thoughts, and that the results of it will be the crowning glory of all utility."

Dr. Hazard's central position is thus: that freedom is the essential prerequisite of man's moral creativeness. Whatever opinion may be held on subordinate points, this central position must remain impregnable so long as man's moral consciousness survives;

that is, so long as he is conscious of being in any degree the *creator* of his own moral character and action. The theory of evolution cannot possibly expunge this fact from his consciousness, or destroy the indestructible connection between morality and freedom. Neither mechanical philosophy, nor mechanical psychology, can ever become scientifically established, as true to all the facts of Nature, until it has succeeded in reconciling the two irreconcilable concepts of morality and mechanism. Be the prevalent opinion of the day what it may, far-seeing philosophers will continue to regard it as a mere ephemeral fashion of the time, until it shall have effected a genuine rational synthesis of all known facts, moral no less than mechanical; and there is no fact more certain than the fact that man is, in no merely mechanical sense, the real author of his own action. That man's whole being has been derived, in an orderly and natural manner, from the universe as a whole, it is the great achievement of the evolution theory to have established beyond a reasonable doubt; but that, in the course of this orderly and natural evolution, he has at last attained to a genuine moral freedom, and won the high dignity and prerogative of a genuine moral creativeness—this is the older insight which Dr. Hazard has vindicated afresh in an age that was in danger of forgetting it.

In the last analysis, every denial of moral freedom is found to rest on a misstatement of the law of cause and effect. Necessarianism plays many variations, but the theme is ever the same. "Every event has a cause; every volition is an event: therefore every volition has a cause." Admitted; but does it follow that volition is also not free? There are events and events: the question is whether a volition is an event of the same order as the motion of a billiard-ball, and has a cause of the same order. The unwarranted assumption that volition and motion are events of the same order, and must have causes of the same order, has led to the invention of that "question-begging epithet" *motive*. The metaphor confounds fundamentally unlike and incongruous things. Instead of saying, "Every event has a cause," it should rather be said, "Every motion has an efficient cause, and every volition has a final cause." \* To assume that volition has an efficient cause is

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\* This idea that volition has only a final cause, though expressed in different terms, pervades all Dr. Hazard's works upon the subject. It is implied in the title of his first

at once to put it into the category of motion, and to solve the gravest problem of anthropology, after the Gordian-knot fashion, by begging the question. It is not science that makes this assumption. Every competent physiologist admits that, be the correlation of physical and psychical events never so close and constant, the real relation of physical motion and psychical change has not yet been discovered, and that it is mere dogmatism to treat one as the efficient cause of the other. Against such a procedure there is one objection, grounded on the very correlation of physical forces, which has never yet been satisfactorily answered. In every event of the physical order, the entirety of antecedent motion is converted into subsequent motion; none of it is lost as motion; it must all be accounted for physically as motion; no infinitesimal fraction of it can be shown to have been converted into psychical change. The chain of molar or molecular motions is complete in itself and infrangible; no conversion of motion into volition is even conceivable, much less demonstrable; and it cannot be assumed, without also assuming that that part of the motion which has been converted into volition, being subtracted from the total antecedent motion, and therefore not appearing in the total subsequent motion, has altogether vanished out of the physical order *in transitu*, and destroyed that quantitative equation of the two motions which the theory itself requires. Such an assumption as this, therefore, can only be made by violating the principle on which it professes to rest. The term *motive* has, in fact, no proper place in the discussion of freedom, being irremediably a "question-begging epithet"; it does not denote a true cause of volition in any other sense than that of final cause, purpose, or end; and

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work, "Freedom of Mind in Willing, or Every Being that Wills a Creative *First Cause*," and also in his last, "Man a Creative First Cause"—"First Cause" being used by him as "a cause which can act without being previously acted upon."

He holds that intelligence in action is the only efficient cause; that the mind is not moved to action by any propulsion in the past, but by its own perception of a reason for making an effort to gratify a recognized existing want. And that it directs its effort to this end by means of its own knowledge, including as an essential element its perception of the future effect of its effort; and as we cannot change the past nor make the present different from what it already is, the only conceivable object of effort—the only motive—is to make the future different from what it otherwise would be. ("Freedom of Willing," pp. 69, 239, 246, 256, 357; "Letters to John Stuart Mill on Causation," etc., pp. 22, 56, §7, p. 99, 122; "Man a Creative First Cause," §§5 and 6.)

the law of causation should be so construed as to correspond with the facts.

Since, then, motion and volition constitute two mutually irreducible phenomena, two phenomena which are fundamentally unlike in kind, it is plainly the worst possible reasoning to confound them under a common term, *event*, and by the use of it, as an "undistributed middle," to infer that volition, no less than motion, must have an efficient cause. So put, the law of causation is a mere bugbear, a scientific blunder, a half-truth that is the worst of falsities. "But must not every event have a cause?" Assuredly; but not in the same sense. Every motion has an efficient cause, and every volition has a final cause—that is the law of causation so stated as not to lose sight of an ineradicable distinction between things that differ, and not to deny a fact as certain as the revolution of the earth round the sun—namely, that fact in the world of human experience which Emerson aptly named the "sovereignty of ethics." Volition, to be volition, must be free from efficient causation; it can have no cause but a final cause. Such freedom as that is the foundation of all ethical distinctions. A volition is the act, or effort to act, of the being that wills—an original activity without which he would cease to be a moral being and become a thing. If it is conceived as the necessary effect of a chain of antecedent causes stretching backwards into an illimitable past (and it must be so conceived if it is efficiently caused), it is then conceived, not as an act of the being that wills, but as an act of the universe itself in all its infinitude. Under such a conception of volition, there is no place for that of personality as given in human experience, above all, in social experience. A person is a being that, within certain limits, freely governs its own activity by final causes, purposes, or ends, and that is not governed by efficient causes; the free formation and free execution of purposes is the essential characteristic of personality. Society is but a community of persons, whose aggregate activity is but the resultant of their mutually co-operative or mutually neutralizing individual activities. Ethics, politics, political economy, jurisprudence, sociology—these all are sciences, every whit as genuine as, though relatively less developed than, the various physical sciences; yet they all depend unconditionally on the existence of persons, as volitional or moral beings. And

the condition of all moral personality is freedom from efficient causation.

Notice that it is in the name of science, not in the name of any actual or ideal religious system, that the postulate of moral freedom is here treated as established by human experience itself. In all its forms, whether permanent, obsolescent, or nascent, religion is here left out of the account; the claim now made is that natural science, in its higher (though relatively immature) departments, is impossible without that postulate. Every science necessarily starts with certain necessary presuppositions; and, just as geometry starts with the given existence of points, lines, surfaces, and solids, ethics must start with the given existence of persons with free volitions. No appeal is here made to the alleged direct testimony of individual consciousness to the existence of freedom; the whole case is now rested on the moral creativeness of individual and generic man, as an observed objective fact of which no scientific explanation can be given unless the fact of free volition is conceded. That is no scientific explanation which begins by denying the fact to be explained; and no ethical system has any claim to be considered scientific, if it begins by denying or ignoring the only ethical quality in human action. It is precisely here that the future battle-field between the mechanical and ethical theories of evolution is unmistakably discernible. Freedom, personality, personal responsibility, moral creativeness—these are not only the fundamental concepts of ethics, but also the most incontestable facts of human life, whether in its individual or social aspect. The problem of the evolution philosophy is to show how, out of elements which apparently comprised only the impersonal, the non-moral, the unfree, personality and morality and freedom have gradually arisen. The mechanical theory of evolution virtually argues that this evolution has not taken place at all, and that, since the original elements manifest only mechanical or efficient causes, the ultimate product also must be mechanical only; while the ethical theory of evolution argues that, since personality and morality and freedom are patent in the ultimate product, they must have been latent in the original elements, as immanent cosmical purpose, end, or final cause. This is the issue yet to be decided, now that evolution in some form has become a foregone conclusion among all who have followed the course of modern

thought. Of course, if the mechanical theory is true, it will override all opposition in the end; but among the logical and ultimately historical results of its victory will be the gradual extinction of all moral ideals based on belief in human freedom, the gradual cessation of all efforts to realize them, the gradual decay of all sentiments which they have created, and the gradual formation of a habit of mind which will contemplate all human actions as intrinsically equal in point of ethical quality, since they are all alike inevitable effects of irresistible causes. Such a result would be the reversal, not the continuation, of the process of moral evolution exhibited by history; and for that reason it throws suspicion, to say the least, on the mechanical theory itself. Only that theory of evolution can finally prevail which shall faithfully follow out the line of evolution already marked out in the history of the past; and this, we believe, will be the theory which fully recognizes and explains the supreme fact of all history—the moral creativeness of man.

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## FACTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.<sup>1</sup>

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF J. G. FICHTE BY A. E. KROEGER.

### CHAPTER V.

#### THE CONTEMPLATION OF GOD AS THE PRINCIPLE OF THE MORAL LAW, OR OF THE FINAL END.

We have seen that life, in its form, as a mere inner self-determination and self-activity, is by no means absolute, but exists for the sake of something else, namely, in order that the final end may be contemplated. In its essence it is not life in this its mere form, but visibility of the final end. As such it appears in

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<sup>1</sup> This article completes the translation of Fichte's "Facts of Consciousness," long since begun in this Journal. It includes the lectures given by Fichte at the University of Berlin during the winter semester of 1810-11. The entire work is now to be found in the "Journal of Speculative Philosophy": Vol. V, pp. 53, 130, 226, 338; Vol. VI, pp. 42, 120, 332; Vol. VII, January, p. 36; Vol. XVII, pp. 130, 263; Vol. XVIII, p. 172.